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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. companies facing bankruptcy risk losing government contracts vital to
their business operation or government capture of ownership interests – neither of
which is favorable to the nation’s economy.1 Popular government contracts

1
See Jacob Pankowski & Kate Bouquard, President Obama Authorizes Major Changes to Federal
Procurement Rules, GT ALERT (Greenberg Traurig LLP), March 2009, at 2, available at
http://www.gtlaw.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/contentpilot-core-401-
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involve matters ranging from technology and defense to pharmaceutical and
transportation industries, none of which are immune from national emergencies,
natural disasters, or the economic downturn. 2 More companies, overall, are
recognizing the need to reorganize or restructure under bankruptcy procedures in
light of the alternatives of a buyout or having to cease operations altogether. 3 In
recent news, it has only been all too typical that a businesses operating primarily
on government contract(s) struggle to stay afloat.
For example,
pharmacogenomics company Perlegen Sciences, Inc. (“Perlegen”) closed its
operations on October 30, 2009, just after making preparations to go public and
announcing the launch of BREVAGen, a clinical test to identify women with
intermediate risk for breast cancer .4 It was unable to remain solvent, due in large
part to losses related to a government contract compounded by R&D
disappointments and exacerbated by the economic crisis.5 Similarly, a technology
and management consulting firm, BearingPoint, accumulating $2.23 billion in
debts6 filed for bankruptcy protection in February 2009, despite its status as a top
100 contractor with the Federal government. 7 BearingPoint fears its Chapter 11
filing will hinder government work, which accounts for the bulk of its business and
accordingly, its future viability.8 Since BearingPoint’s clients include “15 U.S.
federal cabinet level-departments, 23 U.S. states and all of the top 10 global drug
and biotechnology companies,”9 it is arguably a creditable debtor to receive a
second chance to adapt to unforeseeable marketplace trends and avoid premature
dissolution.
Such a second chance is offered to many businesses through bankruptcy
reorganization procedures as set forth by the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”).10 While
the concept of bankruptcy is appealing to debtors as a “fresh start,” it is not a cost
free process, even to a debtor wholly lacking in securable assets. 11 While debtors
tend to benefit from a discharge of their debts through the bankruptcy process, the

11103/pdfCopy.pdf?view=attachment (reporting federal procurement spending in excess of over $500
billion in 2008).
2
Peter Cockerell & Robert A. Bartlett, A Government Contract and Bankruptcy Law Conundrum:
Interpretation of the Anti-Assignment Act and Related Matters, 43 PROCUREMENT LAW. 1, 13 (2007).
3
See U.S. Businesses File for Bankruptcy at a Faster Rate, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 2, 2008,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/02business/02bankrupt.php (indicating that as of June
2008, bankruptcy filings rose thirty-three percent from 2007. The number of companies filing for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy alone also increased to 8,400 from 6,241 in 2007).
4
Turna Ray, Perlegen Defunct: PGx Firm Shutters Doors After R&D Disappointments, Mounting
Losses, PHARMACOGENOMICS REPORTER, Jan. 13, 2010, available at http://www.genomeweb.com/
dxpgx/perlegen-defunct-pgx-firm-shutters-doors-after-rd-disappointments-mounting-losse.
5
Id.
6
Phil Wahba & Andre Grenon, US Judge OKs $350 Million BearingPoint Sale to Deloitte,
REUTERS, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53G4I620090417 (last visited Mar.
7, 2010).
7
Matthew Potter, Bankruptcy for BearingPoint, BNET, Feb. 19, 2009, http://industry.bnet.com/
government/1000562/bankruptcy-for-bearingpoint/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
8
Alejandro Lazo, BearingPoint Seeks Bankruptcy Protection: McLean Consulting Firm Says It
Has No Immediate Plans for Layoffs, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/18/AR2009021801973.html.
9
See supra note 7.
10
See generally, 11 U.S.C. (embodying United States bankruptcy law).
11
MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 3-6 (1995).
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debtor’s bankruptcy record may remain on the debtor’s credit report for 10 years,
permitting lenders to refuse credit and private companies to refuse business. 12
Likewise, courts have not found the principle of debtor enablement exclusive. In
1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re West
Electronics Inc. (“West Electronics”) held that the government was entitled to
terminate a defense contract despite a Code provision enabling debtors to assume
valuable contracts in its effort to reorganize.13 The court relied primarily on the
Federal Anti-Assignment Act to assert that the government can prevent a debtor
from assuming any federal contracts without its consent thereby retaining the right
to terminate the contract for its convenience.14 This Comment takes issue with the
legal conflict concerning businesses that contract heavily or primarily with the
U.S. Government and that seek to reorganize under bankruptcy procedures. This
dispute concerns whether such entities are entitled to classic debtor protection
under the Code, or whether federal law protecting fundamental government
interest in terminating pre-petition contracts supersede.
This Comment’s analysis requires a look at statutory language, congressional
intent and case precedent to support the following position:, in order for a U.S.
Government entity to refuse to recognize the assumption of an executory
contract15 by a debtor party, or the transfer of an executory contract to a third party
assignee, a holistic look at the factual circumstances between the parties, both prepetition and post-petition, is a more valuable legal analysis than the mechanical
application of imprecise statutes like the Federal Anti-Assignment Act. Part II of
this Comment provides background concerning bankruptcy law’s favoritism
towards debtor objectives in light of existing non-debtor safeguards. Part III
addresses conflicts in the Code language, tests derived from the inconsistencies
and applied by the judiciary culminating in a review of stare decisis. Part IV
proposes a four-factor test to guide judicial interpretation in future circumstances
involving executory government contracts within a bankruptcy reorganization
context.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Bankruptcy Code Favors Debtors through Application of the
Automatic Stay
To a debtor, filing a bankruptcy petition is analogous to asking a referee to
call time. The automatic stay pursuant to section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is
a protection mechanism that is triggered immediately upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition. 16 As a result, a debtor’s pre-petition property and possession
are entrusted to an estate, and in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the assets are held until

12

Id. at 6.
In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 79 (3d Cir. 1988).
14
Id. at 82 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 15).
15
Professor Vern Countryman defined an executory contract as a “contract under which the
obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance of
the other.” See Simpson, infra note 30, at 190.
16
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
13
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a plan of reorganization is confirmed and a collective solution is derived to
“provide adequate protection of the property interest of others, such as secured
creditors.”17
While the automatic stay may benefit creditors from having to collect their
debts on a first come, first serve basis, some property interests are at risk. 18 For
example, “the secured creditor who is prevented from foreclosing and the landlord
who is prevented from evicting the delinquent debtor suffer a burden on their
property rights.”19 Sometimes, though the stay may protect the assets in the
debtor’s estate, creditors might wield impact on the debtor’s business in other
ways.20 The principle means for non-debtors to get around the stay is to petition
for relief through the courts under section 362(d). 21 A non-debtor, typically a
creditor, attempts to show that their secured interest in their collateral would suffer
depreciation without relief from the automatic stay. 22 Non-debtor motions for
relief from the automatic stay brought before the court forces a balancing of the
creditor’s interest with the debtor’s opportunity to reorganize. Consequently, “the
Code and the courts balance them by demanding good faith on the part of the
debtor, by demanding . . . ‘adequate protection’ of the secured creditor’s property
interest, and demanding (in some cases) that there be a reasonable possibility of a
successful reorganization within a reasonable time.”23 Therefore, for the purposes
of analyzing successful reorganization for government contractors, the automatic
stay, more importantly, “operates to prevent the non-debtor party from undertaking
unilateral action to terminate an executory contract.”24 In this way, the Code
ensures that the mere filing of a bankruptcy petition does not constitute contractual
breach.25
Other ways around the automatic stay entail applying explicit statutory
exceptions such as governmental regulatory actions.26 This article will examine
other ways the courts have treated the U.S. Government as party to bankruptcy
proceedings. At this time, it is important to remember that although the automatic
stay is not fatal to non-debtors, a recent judicial determination concluded that, “this
Court has recognized the automatic stay’s broad application and noted that such
breadth reflects a congressional intent that courts will presume protection of

17

MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY, 11 (3d ed. 1996)

(2006).
18

Id.
Id. at 14.
20
Id. at 18. This text questions the scope of protection afforded by the automatic stay. It infers
that even with the stay in place, it may do little to “prevent creditors from harassing or suing the
debtor’s managers, who may have guaranteed the debts or may be alleged co-tortfeasors.” Id.
21
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2006).
22
SCARBERRY, supra note 17, at 18.
23
Id. at 19.
24
Richard F. Broude, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in Bankruptcy, A.L.I. 471, 475
(Aug. 26, 1993).
25
HERBERT, supra note 11, at 144 (articulating that even explicit ipso facto clauses stipulating that
a contract is breached based on bankruptcy or insolvency alone are not enforceable).
26
Id. at 18. The text cites to an example in which a debtor who “is violating air pollution
regulations, the automatic stay will not prevent the state or federal regulatory agencies from shutting
down the debtor’s business.” Id.
19
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[debtor’s] property when faced with uncertainty and ambiguity.”27
B. Debtors Rights Through Reorganization Procedures
In a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding, the debtor’s first steps entail
identifying executory contracts, determining its status, and making an assessment
as to whether it should preserve the contract for the survival of debtor’s business.28
A debtor-in-possession (“DIP”)29 or the Chapter 11 trustee has powerful
advantages of four post-petition actions concerning executory contracts: “(1) reject
the contract; (2) assume the contract; (3) assume and assign the contract. . .; or (4)
do nothing and let the contract ‘ride through’ the bankruptcy.”30
Pursuant to section 365(a), the trustee may assume or reject any executory
contract so long as there is no pre-petition default, or if such default arises, section
365(b)(1)(A) allows the trustee to cure the default at the time of assumption or
provide adequate assurance to the court that the trustee will promptly cure the
default.31 The guidelines for assumption include obtaining court approval for the
action and assuming the executory contract in its entirety. As a result, assumption
treats the pre-petition contract as a new one in which any breach of this “new”
contract will lead to damages that must be paid out by the estate as priority
expenses.32 Courts tend to evaluate a debtor’s worthiness to assume a contract
based on a “business judgment” standard (in which the debtor must simply assert
that assuming the contract is a smart business decision) and the court will grant
authority to assume the contract so long as there is no evidence of “bad faith or
abuse of discretion.”33
Like assumption, rejection also requires a court order. However, an
important consideration in seeking rejection of a contract is the risk that filing a
bankruptcy petition in bad faith may be grounds for judicial dismissal of debtor’s
request.34 Bad faith may be found if a court determined that the “rejection of an
important executory contract [was] essentially the sole motive for filing the
Chapter 11 case.”35 While such review for bad faith motives could unfairly
penalize more individual debtors with a single or few contracts over corporate
debtors with numerous contracts, it does force the debtor and debtor’s counsel to
be cautious in identifying their motives for filing Chapter 11.36 Notably, a

27
Kristin S. Simpson, Fifth Circuit’s Executory Contract Standards Deconstructed: The Mirant
Lessons, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 225, 250-51 (2007) (quoting Bonneville Power Admin. v. Mirant Corp.,
440 F.3d 238, 251 (5th Cir. 2006)).
28
DANIEL J. FLANIGAN, UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL ISSUES BEHIND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN
BANKRUPTCY, 3-5 (2006).
29
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108. A debtor-in-possession is the descriptive title for a post-petition
debtor who is authorized by the court to continue his business.
30
Simpson, supra note 27, at 226.
31
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2009).
32
Simpson, supra note 27, at 230.
33
Michelle M. Harner et al., Debtors Beware: The Expanding Universe of Non-assumable/Nonassignable Contracts In Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 187, 193-95 (2005).
34
Broude, supra note 24, at 529-30.
35
FLANIGAN, supra note 28, at 6.
36
Id.
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rejection does not relieve the debtor from the contract obligations altogether. 37 It
is also not accurate to equate rejection to the “debtor’s breach, rescission,
cancellation or modification of the contract.”38 Instead, a rejection in bankruptcy
constitutes a pre-petition breach39 which entitles the non-debtor party to an
unsecured claim as distributed from the bankruptcy estate Unsecured claims are
subject to a pro rata distribution which enables a DIP’s creditors to collect some
damages.40 This distribution system entitles unsecured creditors to monetary
recovery—a chance they might not otherwise have had absent the automatic stay.
At the same time, it is a necessary tool for insolvent debtors owing legal
damages.41
Assigning an executory contract has become an extremely controversial
issue. Such assignment requires assumption as a prerequisite. Authorization to
assign the contract allows the debtor’s estate to “sell the contracts to generate
capital for a reorganization or cash for distribution to creditors.”42 For some
companies, assumption and assignment of executory contracts may be the only
means to a feasible reorganization.43 A bankruptcy principle of free assignability
can be extracted from Code section 365(f). 44 Some legal analysts suggest that the
principle is so powerful that it trumps state laws. 45 The controversy lies, however,
with respect to enumerated anti-assignment provisions and certain federal nonbankruptcy laws.
C. Non-Debtor Safeguards
1. Relief from Automatic Stay
There are two bases for petitioning relief from the automatic stay. 46
Creditors seek relief when the stay prevents them from asserting rights to property
of the debtor, debtor’s estate, or property simply in the possession of the debtor.47
Or, creditors may appeal to the court to have the stay lifted or modified when they

37

Id.
Simpson, supra note 27, at 227.
39
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006).
40
Simpson, supra note 27, at 227.
41
“As an illustration, if a contract provides for $175,000 in liquidated damages for breach, and the
debtor’s estate will pay out $0.10 on the dollar to general unsecured claims, the non-debtor contracting
party will have a $175,000 general unsecured claim but receive $17,500 for the breach claim.” Id.
42
David R. Kuney, Restructuring Dilemmas for the High Technology Licensee: Will “Plain
Meaning” Bring Order to the Chaotic Bankruptcy Law for Assumption and Assignment of Technology
Licenses?, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 123, 135 (2008).
43
See In re Carolina Parachute Corp., 108 B.R. 100, 102 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
44
See generally Kuney, supra note 42, at 134–37; 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (2009).
45
“This right to freely assign contracts creates a business result that cannot be obtained under
normal state-law rules, and in this sense, bankruptcy notions have pre-empted state law.” Kuney, supra
note 42, at 136–37.
46
DON CAMPBELL ET AL., CREDITORS’ RIGHTS HANDBOOK 424 (Clark Boardman Callaghan
1993–94).
47
Id.; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(a)(1).
38
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want to bring some other adverse action to the debtor. 48 Any adjustment to the
automatic stay must be substantiated with “cause.”49 Eligible “cause” ranges from
proving “absence of harm to the estate or severe harm to the creditor or other
parties in interest,” in addition to showing a lack of adequate protection of a
creditor’s interest, or in the alternative, a debtor’s lack of equity in the property
coupled with the property’s dispensability for reorganization purposes.50 The nondebtor party seeking this relief must anticipate evidentiary demands of the court in
proving the value of contested property, the lack of adequate protection, the
likelihood of the debtor’s reorganization, and possibly even financial statements to
substantiate grounds that relief from stay is necessary for the continued existence
of the creditor’s business.51 While the automatic stay provides immediate
assistance to insolvent debtors who file bankruptcy, the legislature was careful to
limit its scope to afford the DIP or trustee the opportunity to arrange the property
of the estate in a manner that balances the priorities of creditor’s rights.52 Just as
quickly as a stay is imposed upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, termination of
the stay is automatically triggered when the purpose of its scope ceases. 53
2. Financial Accommodations Contracts
Some express limitations to assignability are listed in the Code. For
example, Code section 365(c)(2) classifies financial accommodation contracts as
exempt from the principle of free assignability. 54 According to the Eleventh
Circuit:
The term ‘financial accommodations’ is not defined in the
statute; however, the legislative history of §365 provides insight
into Congress’ intent in using this term: Characterization of
contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or
financial accommodations, is limited to the extension of cash or
a line of credit and is not intended to embrace ordinary leases or
contracts to provide goods or services with payments to be made
over time.55
The exemption is a logical one; a debtor who enters into a loan agreement
prior to filing bankruptcy should not be able to bind the non-debtor to go forward
and issue the loan knowing that repayment in full by the debtor’s estate is almost
impossible.56

48
CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 46, at 424. An example of such action cited by the test is “a state
court action.” Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 424–25; 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2009).
51
CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 46 at 427–28.
52
HERBERT, supra note 11, at 117.
53
Id.
54
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2).
55
SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 17, at 373.
56
Id.
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3. Personal Service Contracts
A general tenet in the law of contracts concerning the assignment of rights
and delegation of duties is that the “duty to perform a personal service contract
cannot be delegated.”57 This tenet is encompassed in Code section 365(c)(1)(A),
which authorizes a non-debtor, in certain circumstances, the right to prohibit the
debtor or DIP from assigning the right of performance on the contract.58
Somewhat redundantly, Code section 365(c)(1)(B) adds the requirement that the
non-debtor party does not consent to any assignment. 59 The reasoning behind the
ban on a transfer of a personal service contract to a third party assignee is the
pivotal concern that the performance of the contract terms by the debtor or DIP
was so specific and narrowly tailored to the non-debtor party that any substitute
would change the intended or original term(s) of the contract. Parties who enter
into personal service contracts tend to “rely on ‘qualities such as the character,
reputation, skill, or discretion of the party that is to render’ performance,” and
therefore, any delegation of the contract term to a third party is an unlikely
substitute.60
4. “Applicable Law” Limitations
Aside from financial accommodation contracts, personal services contracts,
and certain leases, there are also contracts made non-delegable or non-assignable
by law.61 Where a debtor possesses the power to assume or assign an existing
contract even if prohibited by “applicable law,” the general consensus is to
interpret “applicable law” as “applicable non-bankruptcy law.”62 The “applicable
law” at issue in this Comment with respect to executory government contracts is
the Federal Anti-Assignment Act. To understand how non-bankruptcy laws like
the Federal Anti-Assignment Act affect the general bankruptcy provisions
governing executory contracts, an overview of Code section 365 is necessary.
III. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
A. Inconsistencies
1. Code Conflict Within § 365
Code section 365(a) grants a trustee the general right to assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.63 In Chapter 11 cases,
however, since the debtor is seeking to reorganize his business while maintaining
current operations, the help of a trustee is unnecessary and one is rarely appointed

57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 375.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A).
See id. § 365(c)(1)(B).
Harner et al., supra note 33, at 206.
See generally SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 17, at 373.
Cockerell, supra note 2, at 13.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).

2010

BANKRUPTCY AND THE FEDERAL ANTI-ASSIGNMENT ACT

289

to the debtor. (Contrastingly, trustees are court-ordered in most Chapter 7 cases.)
Thus, Code section 365(a) may be read as referring directly to a debtor or DIP’s
rights. Logically, “there is no reason for precluding the DIP from assuming its
own contract and continuing to render services or other performance called for by
the contract or lease.”64 The first limitation to an assumption, indicated in Code
section 365(b)(1), is a contractual default. 65 Essentially, in order to assume an
executory contract in which the debtor failed to fulfill his terms of the contract, the
provision requires him to cure the default or provide adequate assurance that the
debtor will “promptly cure.”66 Thus far, the means to assume a contract are
straightforward.
The provisions of section 365 become thorny in subsection (c). The
language concerning explicit non-assignable contracts was covered in the
discussion on financial accommodations and personal service contracts, but a more
significant limitation concerns “applicable law” that excuses the non-debtor from
accepting or rendering performance in accordance with the terms of his contract
with the debtor or DIP.67 Courts have identified “applicable law” to include patent
law, copyright law, and the Federal Anti-Assignment Act.68 These laws come into
conflict with bankruptcy principles in several ways.
First, the scope of protection for intellectual property rights are found in the
Constitution, specifically, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, which grants a limited
monopoly to authors and inventors for their creative expressions and novel
inventions.69 Therefore, there is clear rationale to support the Patent Act exegesis
that “patents shall have attributes of personal property.”70 It follows that, with this
view, patents and like intellectual property assets may share the same level of nonassignability as personal service contracts. Although more insightful legal
commentary on the issue distinguishes between transfers involving an assignment
versus a license or an exclusive license versus a non-exclusive license, the bottom
line is that bankruptcy courts have agreed to the “notion that federal common law
prohibits the assignment of a patent license without the consent of the licensor and
that this federal common law pre-empts any state law or bankruptcy policy, which
permits assignment despite the licensor’s opposition.”71 While some experts find
patent licenses more analogous to commodities and not personal services, they
concede to the reality that case precedent reflects a decision to value an economic
policy that encourages invention over one that promotes business reorganization. 72
Judicial trends reveal that the Federal Anti-Assignment Act also trumps
bankruptcy principles because “executory contracts and unexpired leases to which
64
Jay R. Indyke et al., Ending the “Hypothetical” vs. “Actual” Test Debate: A New Way to Read
Section 365(c)(1), 16 J. BANKR. LAW & PRAC., Apr. 2007, at 3.
65
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1).
66
Id.
67
Id. at § 365(c)(1) (2006).
68
41 U.S.C. § 15 (2009).
69
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
70
Kuney, supra note 42, at 128 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000)).
71
Id. at 130.
72
Id. at 132–34.
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the federal government is a party may not be assigned outside of bankruptcy.”73
In many cases, pre-petition contracts between the U.S. government and a
government contractor did not survive post-petition based on bankruptcy standing
alone. Like the Patent Act, this is another example illustrating how “applicable
law” is antithetical to promoting debtor reorganization.
The designation “applicable law” is found again in Code section 365(e).74
While the statutory language almost mirrors that of section 365(c), the legal result
is that section 365(e) bars the enforcement of contract clauses that terminate or
modify an entire agreement based simply on the act of filing bankruptcy (ipso
facto clauses),75 but carves an exception for “applicable law” that excuses the nonfiling party from accepting or rendering performance according to the terms of the
contract regardless of any stipulated anti-assignment clause.76 Basically, the
exception allows a non-debtor asserting any “applicable law” to restore the effect
of an existing ipso facto clause.77 One distinction is that under section365(c), the
non-debtor party is exempted from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to the “debtor or debtor-in-possession,” whereas under section 365(e),
that phrase is replaced with “trustee or assignee.”78 Many scholars have noted this
distinction but fail to reach any unanimous perspective on its legal significance.79
There is, however, an undisputed recognition that § 365(c) is at odds with
section 365(f). While section 365(f) proposes to reinforce the rules set forth in
subsections (b) and (c), it contends that, regardless of provisions in the contract or
“applicable law” that hinder assignment of an executory contract, the trustee may
assign so long as (1) the trustee assumes the contract and (2) provides adequate
assurance of an assignee’s future performance.80 Thus, the general principle of
section 365(c) prohibiting a trustee from assuming or assigning an executory
contract if dictated by “applicable law,” seems to be voidable by application of
section 365(f) so long as the trustee can fulfill the two required prongs. The
judiciary has tried to reconcile the provisions into one approach, but the outcome
lead to two interpretations: the “Hypothetical Test” and the “Actual Test.”81
2. Hypothetical vs. Actual Tests
The hypothetical test looks to the plain statutory language in section 365(c)
stating that “[t]he trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract . . . if

73

Harner et al., supra note 33, at 223.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2009).
75
Ipso facto clauses are defined as contract or lease provisions that force “termination of the
contract or lease in the event of the insolvency or weakening financial condition of one of the parties.”
Harner et al., supra note 33, at 247.
76
See Nancy C. Dreher, Fifth Circuit Adopts the “Actual” Rather Than the “Hypothetical” Test
for Application of 11 U.S.C.A. §365(e)(2)(A) and Holds that Government Agency Could Not Rely on Its
Ipso Fact[o] Clause to Terminate an Executory Contract with Debtor, BANKR. SERVICE CURRENT
AWARENESS ALERT, 2006.
77
Id.
78
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c), and § 365(e).
79
Harner et al., supra note 33, at 233.
80
11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1).
81
Harner et al., supra note 33, at 233.
74
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applicable law excuses a [non-debtor] party,”82 and asserts that if a debtor cannot
assign an executory contract because he is prevented by applicable law, then the
debtor cannot assume the contract post-petition either. This view was made
popular since the Third Circuit’s holding in In re West Electronics, Inc.,83 and thus
far, the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have followed suit. 84 The Third
Circuit held that a pre-petition executory contract between the United States and a
defense contractor could not be assumed after the contractor filed for bankruptcy
because the Federal Anti-Assignment Act as “applicable law” made assignment
impermissible.85 Thus, the logic was that if assignment was impermissible, and
assignment required assumption, but a trustee, debtor, or DIP could not “assume or
assign,”86 it follows that assumption was likewise impermissible. The analysis in
West Electronics was incomplete because it failed to consider whether the debtor
had even intended to assign the government contract.
Almost a decade later, a countervailing approach, referred to as the “Actual
Test,” interpreted the bankruptcy provision of section 365(c) to require actual
intent to assign a contract.87 Without a definite and immediate intent to assign an
executory contract to a valid third party, the First Circuit in Summit v. Leroux
determined that “section 365(c) did not prevent assumption.”88 Notably, the court
looked to the legislative purpose of section 365(c) and asserted that it served to
balance support for a debtor’s chance at reorganization by “provid[ing] the
counter-party with the benefit of its bargain.”89 Further, courts have reasoned that
Congress must have intended to allow otherwise non-delegable contracts to be
assumed if the DIP and not any third party assignee is actually assuming it because
even in an extreme case involving a personal service contract, the terms dictating
performance remain between the two pre-petition parties.90
Tracing the provisions from Code sections 365(a) to 365(f), it is possible to
summarize a debtor’s right to assume or assign an executory contract as follows:
(1) a debtor may assume a pre-petition executory contract as long as the debtor did
not default or if the debtor took steps to cure the default; (2) if “applicable law”
excuses a non-debtor party from recognizing the performance terms of a contract,
it is only the non-debtor’s authorization that will allow a DIP to assume the
executory contract; (3) consequently, the non-debtor’s explicit permission,
waiver,91 or non-action may render an assignment of the contract by the DIP valid;
(4) a caveat to non-debtor waiver or non-action validation of an assignment is the
requirement that an assignment is subject to notice of assurance on future

82

11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A).
See generally 852 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1988).
84
Kuney, supra note 42, at 145.
85
Id. at 146.
86
11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006).
87
Kuney, supra note 42, at 146.
88
Id. at 149 (citing Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 612 (1st Cir. 1995)).
89
Kuney, supra note 42, at 150.
90
SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 17, at 377.
91
See Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. United States, 542 F.3d 889 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that
the United States properly waived its right under the Anti-Assignment Act to invalidate assignments).
83
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performance.92 Ultimately, the only firm guarantee for any debtor or DIP to
assume and assign an executory contract rests with non-debtor permission.93
B. Code and Congress Conflict
1. Legislative Intent Behind the Federal Anti-Assignment Act
This Comment is primarily concerned with the interpretation of the Federal
Anti-Assignment Act as “applicable law” excusing a non-debtor government party
from pre-petition contractual obligations. The Anti-Assignment Act provides, “No
contract or order, or any interest therein, shall be transferred by the party to whom
such contract or order is given to any other party, and any such transfer shall cause
the annulment of the contract or order transferred, so far as the United States is
concerned.”94
The legislative intent to draft such a statute has been articulated as a concern
to ameliorate inconveniences to the government if the potential exist for
contractual obligations to be modified.95 For example, without the statute, a
government contractor might assign the contract to multiple subcontractors and not
the party it sought to deal with on an exclusive basis. Additional speculation
concerning the purpose of the Anti-Assignment Act entails a wariness for
deception, specifically, “persons obtaining claims against the government and
using them to influence officers of the government.”96
The legislative intent to draft such a statute has been articulated as a concern
to ameliorate inconveniences to the government if the potential exists for
contractual obligations to be modified.97 For example, without the statute, a

92

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a)–(f) (2009).
This contention is presumed by this Author.
94
Simpson, supra note 27; In re Mirant Corp., 440 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 41 U.S.C.
§ 15(a) (2009)).
95
Lucantonio N. Salvi & Marko W. Kipa, “Standing Novation,” THE DEAL (February 8, 2008),
http://www.governmentcontractslawblog.com/Standing%20Novation.pdf (explaining that “Congress
was clear about the rationale behind this statutory regime: The government should only deal with the
contracting party with whom it entered into an agreement and should not be put in a position of having
to deal simultaneously with other entities, including in the context of litigation and “claims emanating
from multiple sources. However, as is the case with most rules, the prohibition contained in the AntiAssignment Act is not absolute and the Government is permitted expressly to consent to the assignment
of a government contract”).
96
Harner et al., supra note 33, at 224. See also United States. v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 291-92
(1952) (asserting the purposes of the Anti-Assignment Act as “undoubtedly to prevent persons of
influence from buying up claims against the United States, which might then be improperly urged upon
officers of the Government,’ and that a second purpose was ‘to prevent possible multiple payment of
claims, to make unnecessary the investigation of alleged assignments, and to enable the Government to
deal only with the original claimant.’ Other courts have found yet another purpose of the statue, namely,
to save the United States ‘defenses which it has to claims by an assignor by way of set-off,
counterclaim, etc., which might not be applicable to an assignee’”).
97
Lucantonio N. Salvi & Marko W. Kipa, Standing Novation, THE DEAL (February 8, 2008),
http://www.governmentcontractslawblog.com/Standing%20Novation.pdf
93

Congress was clear about the rationale behind this statutory regime: The
government should only deal with the contracting party with whom it entered
into an agreement and should not be put in a position of having to deal
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government contractor might assign the contract to multiple subcontractors and not
the party it sought to deal with on an exclusive basis. Additional speculation
concerning the purpose of the Anti-Assignment Act entails a wariness for
deception, specifically, “persons [] obtaining claims against the government and
using them to influence officers of the government.”98
In cases like West Electronics, where a government contract involved
supplies for missile launching to the U.S. Air Force, it is rational to maintain a
policy of non-assignability in the interest of national security. The West
Electronics court has been subsequently criticized for its failure to limit the
application of the Anti-Assignment statute to contracts involving the production of
military equipment.99 Instead, the case set a broad precedent in cases involving
government contracts, whereby the Anti-Assignment Act “applies regardless of
whether (a) the contract is one for personal services or (b) the identity of the party
is material to the contract.”100
2. Judicial Application
Established in 1953, the premise, that “[i]f the contract is of the sort where
the government depends upon certain characteristics or abilities of the contractor,
then the prohibition of 41 U.S.C. §15 will apply,”101 should remain the appropriate
judicial standard for determining the possibility of assumption and assignment
notwithstanding the Anti-Assignment Act. While it is important at times to come
up with bright-line rules to maintain consistency of judicial interpretation, looking
to case precedent provides a better indication of where the courts are headed, what
the courts have missed, and how our knowledge from retrospect allows legal
practitioners to shape a more uniformed legal analysis.

simultaneously with other entities, including in the context of litigation and
“claims emanating from multiple sources. However, as is the case with most
rules, the prohibition contained in the Anti-Assignment Act is not absolute and
the Government is permitted expressly to consent to the assignment of a
government contract.
Id.
98
Harner et al., supra note 33, at 224. See also United States. v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 291-92
(1952). The purposes of the Anti-Assignment Act are:

[U]ndoubtedly to prevent persons of influence from buying up claims against the
United States, which might then be improperly urged upon officers of the
Government,” and that a second purpose was “to prevent possible multiple
payment of claims, to make unnecessary the investigation of alleged assignments,
and to enable the Government to deal only with the original claimant.” Other
courts have found yet another purpose of the statue, namely, to save the United
States “defenses which it has to claims by an assignor by way of set-off, counter
claim, etc., which might not be applicable to an assignee.”).
Shannon, 342 U.S. at 291-92.
99
Cockerell, supra note 2, at 14.
100
Harner, supra note 33, at 225.
101
See In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 12 B.R. 977, 984 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (citing
Thompson v. C.I.R., 205 F.2d 73, 77 (3d Cir. 1953)).
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C. Any Resolve Found in Case Precedent?
The conflict between bankruptcy law and federal common law is
complicated. The analysis inevitably leads to the underlying dilemma as to whether
the US economy would benefit more from protecting and encouraging debtor
reorganization plans or support the government’s discretion in common law
contractual rights. This is of increasing concern due to the current economic
environment; the government is bailing out banks; should it also “bail out”
businesses which rely heavily on government contracts? On the other hand, there
may be important health and safety considerations behind protecting government’s
right to deny assignment of contracts. Stare decisis sheds light on important
considerations, or the lack thereof, in determining whether to allow a debtor in
possession to assume and assign an executory contract.
1. Case History Champions Government Favoritism
The anchor to executory government contract cases is In re West Electronics,
Inc.102 In that case, a Third Circuit court determined that the Anti-Assignment Act
was “applicable law” for the purposes of Code section 365(c) which entitled the
government to annul a contract for missile supply from a DIP.103 The court
reasoned that since the Code provision required consent by the non-debtor
(government) party in order for the DIP to assume any executory contract, and a
federal statute prohibits the transfer (or assignment) of a government contract for
lack of the same consent, then the result is a foreclosure on debtor’s right to
assume any contract it is not entitled to assign. 104 On its face, the judicial logic
seems reasonable. However, the court further narrowed its basis by pointing to the
fact that the contract involved the production of military equipment and explained
that “West could not force the government to accept the ‘personal attention and
services’ of a third party without its consent” because the personal attention and
service given to military equipment was what Congress had in mind when it passed
the Anti-Assignment Act.105 The reasoned specificity of this holding begs the
consideration of assignments involving government contracts having nothing to do
with military supply. Interestingly, the bankruptcy judge who first deliberated
over the facts in this case denied the government’s legal position because “there
were no exigent circumstances arising from national defense considerations
requiring lifting of the stay.”106 On appeal at the district court level, however, the
judicial determination affirming the bankruptcy court decision rested on a the
notion that as long as West Electronics, Inc. (“West”) represented that it “had the
capacity and intention to cure the default” the automatic stay protection should
remain enforced.107 Unconvinced, the Third Circuit applied the literal application

102

See In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 79 (3d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 82.
104
Id. at 83. This line of reasoning follows because like the Federal Anti-Assignment Act which
prohibits the transfer of a government contract to a third party, Code section 365(c)(1) excuses the
government from accepting performance from third party.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 81.
107
See In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d at 81.
103
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of the Anti-Assignment Act and accepted the government’s assertion that any
capacity or intent to cure was irrelevant. 108
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in a case involving an unexpired lease,109 held
that federal aeronautics and space regulations set forth by the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) were “applicable law” for the purposes of Code section
365(c) which gave the FAA discretionary powers in refusing to allow assumption
of an airport terminal facilities lease or reserve airport landing slots by a DIP. 110
The court asserted that because the FAA had specific standards for assigning use
of navigable airspace which meet vital requirements of national defense, no party
may lease airport terminal space without FAA permission. 111 More specifically,
the court noted that the prospective assignee, PSA, was not among the approved air
carriers to operate at a national airport.112 Also, the airport landing slots formerly
allocated to Braniff were denied to Braniff when the company became a DIP
because it was necessary for the FAA to “minimize the effect of Braniff’s
abandonment of service on the traveling public” resulting from Braniff’s decision
to “abruptly ceased all operations” prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. 113 Under
the Federal Aviation Act,114 the FAA retains all rights of assignment concerning
navigable airspace including the discretion to “modify or revoke such assignment
when required in the public interest.”115 While the case at hand illustrates again,
how “applicable law” under Code section 365(c) works in conjunction with federal
rules designating assignment powers to one party prohibiting debtor’s traditional
assumption and assignment rights, the holding clearly attributes the outcome to
reasons beyond the mechanical application of the statutory provisions. 116

108
Id. at 82. Although the case articulates the government’s position insofar as it asserts that
“West should not be permitted to cure its default even if it is capable of doing so,” the more appropriate
party that the government should contend is not allowed to cure is the assignee. Id. The case points to
conflicting interpretation over the precise type of assignment prohibited by the Code. The Third Circuit
emphasizes the literal reading of Code section 365(c)(1) and concludes that “West as a debtor” is a
distinct entity from “West as a debtor in possession.” Id. at 83. The dissenting opinion, however,
reinforces West’s argument that the correct interpretation concerning the purpose of the AntiAssignment Act was the possibility of binding the U.S. government to a “wholly separate” and
unknown defense contractor. Id. at 84.
109
Section § 365(c) applies to both executory contracts and unexpired leases of a debtor.
110
In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1983).
111
Id. at 943. The Braniff court conveys a three-fold purpose behind the FAA control over
airspace: (1) centralizing the administrative power over the safe and efficient use of airspace (2)
national security concerns, and (3) competitive air transportation that is responsible to the needs of the
public. Id. at 941. In this case, Braniff entered into a proposed agreement with its creditors referred to
as the “PSA Transaction” which represented an understanding between the parties that Braniff would
transfer the landing slots and airport lease to PSA. Id. at 939.
112
Id. at 943.
113
Id. at 940.
114
See 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (2009).
115
In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d at 941.
116
In contrast to the West Electronics case, the judicial discourse in Braniff does not summarize its
holding by stating that Code section 365(c) excuses a non-debtor party from accepting performance
from an assignee so long as applicable law enumerates such and the lessor does not convey any consent.
Instead, the court rationalizes two circumstances that gave rise to repeal of the PSA Transaction. First,
because PSA was not authorized to operate at a national airport, the government’s contractual benefit of
the initial bargain between it and Braniff would be lost; the FAA’s objective was to serve the public in
its capacity as a competitive enterprise that operates within the confines of national security measures.

296

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. III:II

Next consider In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.117 Here, Government
National Mortgage Association (“GNMA”)118 obtained relief from automatic stay
in bankruptcy court after asserting that the mortgage-backed security or guarantee
agreement it had with a mortgage lender was a non-assignable executory contract
terminable at GNMA’s discretion for various legal reasons. The opinion discusses
in great depth the legal conclusions in support of contract termination. First, the
guaranty agreements are non-assignable under applicable law as articulated by
Code section 365(c) and such qualifying law could be the statute governing
guarantee agreements under 12 U.S.C. §1721(g)119 or the federal Anti-Assignment
Act. Second, GNMA’s appropriate basis for relief from automatic stay came in the
form of the adversary preceding it initiated whereby its foundational argument
rests on the fact that preserving the automatic stay does not help the debtor.120
Ultimately however, the raison d’être lies in the conclusion that “[t]he Guarantee
Agreements are executory contracts to make financial accommodations for the
benefit of the debtor, and therefore the debtor is prohibited from assuming them
without GNMA’s consent” and it did not consent.121 Financial accommodation
contracts are strictly prohibited from assignability. 122 While the case could have
been decided solely on the financial accommodation classification, the court
seemed to have found it imperative to reference the interplay between Code section
365(c) and the Anti-Assignment Act. In doing so, the court elaborated on the
purpose of the Anti-Assignment Act likening the guarantee agreements to personal
service contracts.123 Additionally, because GNMA considered the debtor in default
for failure to reach net worth requirements which correlated with the “viability of
its program, and indirectly to the housing industry of this nation,” the implication

Id. at 941. PSA’s decision not to apply to, or failure to qualify under the U.S. Government’s air carrier
approval process, deemed it a liability to the government whose practice is to allocate landing slots to
air carriers that meet the safety and security standards as set by the Department of Transportation and
FAA. Id. at 938. Additionally, Braniff could not assume the terminal lease, much less assign the lease
to PSA, due to pre-petition default. Id. at 939. Similarly, the facts in West Electronics point to debtor’s
pre-petition problems in performing the terms of the contract, yet the court circumvented the breach as a
basis for its holding.
117
See In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 12 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
118
GNMA is a corporate entity owned and controlled by the United States Government. Id. at 980.
119
In re Commonwealth Mortgage Co., Inc., 145 B.R. 368 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (concluding
that the automatic stay does not apply to GNMA actions when it is exercising its statutory duties under
12 U.S.C. § 1721(g), which provides that no state, local or federal law (except federal law expressly
referring to this subsection) shall limit GNMA exercise of contractual rights; thus, GNMA could
declare default and require turnover of pooled mortgages backing mortgaged backed securities serviced
by debtor).
120
See In re Adana, 12 B.R. at 988. The court explains that it is “inevitable” that termination of
the guarantee agreements will be granted according to Code section 365(e)(2) for lack of GNMA
consent to any assignment or assumption by Adana and therefore, Adana will be left without any means
for an effective reorganization. Id. Essentially, Adana is simply another “thinly capitalized” mortgage
lender whose success is dependent on its participation in and adherence to the rules of the GNMA
mortgage-backed securities program. Id. at 987.
121
Id. at 987 (emphasis added).
122
See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
123
The court quotes a Third Circuit case asserting that “[i]f the contract is of the sort where the
government depends upon certain characteristics or abilities of the contractor, then the prohibition of 41
U.S.C. § 15 will apply.” In re Adana, 12 B.R. at 984 n.2. For the GNMA, the court believes that certain
necessary characteristics a qualified mortgage lender include “integrity, efficiency and management
capabilities.” Id.
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made was that a material requirement of the contract was not met and the GNMA’s
program objective to benefit the public welfare was put at risk. 124
A few years after In re Adana, a district court in New York faced a similar
controversy involving a DIP and a government benefits contract. Instead of
mortgaged-backed securities to benefit the U.S. housing market, In re Nitec Paper
Corporation involved low-cost electric power supply in the Niagara region.125
The factual disposition of this case begins with the congressional enactment of the
Niagara Redevelopment Act (“NRA”).126 The NRA gave the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) the authority to endow an entity called the
Power Authority of New York (“Power Authority”) to allocate “replacement
power” (equivalent power supply lost from the destruction of a hydro-electric play
attributed to natural disaster) to Niagara-Mohawk (“NMO”) a public utility power
company.127 Nitec Paper Corporation (“Nitec”) contracted with NMO to purchase
low-cost electric power supply in bulk.128 When Nitec filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy, the corporation moved to assume its contract with NMO and transfer
two-thirds of its power supply to a third party, Occidental Chemical Corporation
(“OCC”) for a term of six months.129 The transfer stipulated that OCC would pay
the low-cost price to NMO and a “surcharge of $35,000 per month” to Nitec.130
Power Authority refused to approve the transfer. 131 The New York district court
deferred to Power Authority’s decision to deny Nitec’s assumption and

124
Id. at 982. The guarantee agreement listed conditions that would lead to automatic default and
other conditions that allude to possible default. Id. at 980. The “(1) failure to make monthly payments
on the certificates as they become due and (2) the application by the issuer for an advance from GNMA
to pay the certificate holder” were obligations that had to be met by the issuer, or would constitute
breach. Id. Other likely events leading to default included “(1) failure to give advance notice of
bankruptcy, (2) failure to maintain a specified minimum net worth established by GNMA, and (3) the
actual filing of a petition in bankruptcy.” Id. GNMA claimed that Adana’s decision to file bankruptcy
triggered two of the optional default conditions; the failure to maintain minimum net worth and failure
to give notice prior to filing a bankruptcy petition. Id. at 981-82. When GNMA acted to terminate
debtor’s rights as issuer under the Guarantee agreements and take ownership and custody of related
Adana bank accounts, Adana responded by filing a motion for contempt in court on the basis that
GNMA’s acts were violations of the automatic stay. It is the perspective of this author that these facts
support the contention that the court’s detailed discussion concerning Code section 365(c) and the AntiAssignment Act was unnecessary to the court’s holding. First, if GNMA is faulting Adana for failure to
give advance notice of the bankruptcy filing, then Adana committed a pre-petition breach of the
guarantee agreement and the automatic stay could not prevent its termination and the analysis would
end here. On the other hand, if the notice requirement was considered a post-petition default then the
automatic stay prevents GNMA from taking any action on that basis and the remaining basis for
termination would be the net worth requirement. The problem here, however, is that imposing strict
compliance to the net worth requirement seems harsh when Adana continued to make payments as
required to mortgage certificate holders and because GNMA’s primary reason for having this optional
default requirement was because it threatened a debtor’s ability to make payments. Id. at 981-92
(emphasis added). This court’s decision appears to set a trend followed by the West court to overlook a
debtor’s ability to perform.
125
In re Nitec Paper Corp., 43 B.R. 492, 493 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
126
Id. at 494.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 493.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 493.
131
In re Nitec Paper Corp., 43 B.R. at at 494. The bankruptcy court approved the transfer and
Power Authority appealed to the New York district court.
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assignability of the contract based on the following legal justifications: (1) NRA
should not be “a method [of] financ[ing] a Chapter 11 debtor,132 (2) under Code
section 365(c), the “applicable law” referring to the NRA vests the restoration of
electric power supply with Power Authority so without its approval, Nitec’s
proposed actions must be adjudicated invalid.133 The court also adopted the view
that the Code may allow assignment of an executory contract even if contractual
provisions bar the assignment but not if an action violates a specific statutory
mandate forbidding assignment. 134 The bottom line was that Nitec’s attempt to
assume a contract involving federally subsidized electric power for sale at market
price to a third party violated state, federal, and bankruptcy laws.
The court in In re Pennsylvania Peer Review returned to more simplistic
grounds for government preclusion of contract assumption by a DIP. 135 Peer
Review Organization entered into a contract with federal government’s Health
Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”), to “review. . . health care services
furnished under the Medicare program in Pennsylvania.”136 Sometime after
paying Peer Review for two months of work, Peer Review alleged that “HCFA
withheld further payment and subsequently wrongfully terminated the
contract.”137 The facts further indicate that Peer Review filed bankruptcy seven
months after entering into contract with HCFA. 138 Peer Review challenged the
termination on the basis that (1) HCFA did not abide by statutory termination
requirements of 42 U.S.C. §1320(c)-2(d)(1), and (2) HCFA committed a violation
of Peer Review’s “[c]onstitutional right to due process” because no hearing was
ever held and 42 U.S.C. §1320(c)-2(d)(2) lists a ninety-day notice requirement for
prospective termination action. 139 The government invalidated Peer Review’s
assertions by referencing 42 U.S.C. §1320(c)-2(f) mandating “[a]ny determination
by the Secretary to terminate or not to renew a contract under this section shall not
be subject to judicial review.”140 Like the cases aforementioned, the government
in Peer Review took the position that it is entitled to absolute contractual rights not

132
Id. at 495. While Nitec’s agreement with OCC seems to have a profit-making component, the
court simply concluded that it wasn’t Congress’ intent for companies to benefit beyond affordable
power supply that existed prior to the hydro-electric plant destruction. Id. The court does mention that
although resale of such power supply may promote “the rehabilitation of bankrupt companies, [] it does
so here by infusing into the [DIP’s] estate money to which the estate is not entitled.” Id. The court fails
to address how customers of low-power electricity would be hurt by a resale of Nitec’s transfer to OCC,
especially considering its proportional allocation and limited duration. Id.
133
Id. at 495. Although Nitec’s unsuccessful attempt to make the argument that Code section
365(c) should be limited to personal service contracts is rebutted by the longstanding viewpoint that
“[s]urely if Congress had intended to limit section 365(c) specifically to personal service contracts, its
members could have conceived of a more precise term than ‘applicable law’ to convey that meaning,” a
closer look that the purposes behind such laws correlate with personal service contract treatment. Id. at
497; see also infra Part V.
134
Id. at 498.
135
Pa. Peer Review Org. v. United States, 50 B.R. 640, 642 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985).
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 641. The facts of the case are silent as to the timeframe in which HFCA payments made
to Peer Review stopped and the contract was terminated. Id. at 642.
139
Id. at 642. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c)-2(d)(2) (2009).
140
Pa. Peer Review Org., 50 B.R. at 642.
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limited to terminating a contract “at its convenience.”141 The government position
almost implies federal statute may override due process. Without actually taking
such an extreme position, the court directed Peer Review to bring a wrongful
contract termination claim asserted in an action seeking damages in order for the
constitutional violation issue to be adjudicated.142
Similarly, in In re Carolina Parachute Corp.,143 the district court overturned
the bankruptcy court’s decision by granting relief from automatic stay to the
United States Army seeking to terminate its contract with a government contractor
that manufactured parachutes and held that because the Anti-Assignment Act
would bar the assignment of the parties’ agreement without the consent of the
government, that the debtor could not assume the contract. The debtor’s primary
motive for seeking assumption was corporate vitality; the opinion cited, “This
court is aware of the compelling facts of this case, not the least of which is that
defense contracts with the government constitute debtor’s primary, if not only,
source of revenue.”144 The court in this case did not consider, however, whether
the contracts were of a personal service nature or if the identity of the contracting
party was material even though there were enough facts to weigh those
considerations.145 This is yet another illustration in a long line of judicial holdings
contributing to a trend giving blanket affect to executory contract treatment by
federal statute and possible judicial indolence. 146
The bankruptcy court in In re Plum Run Service Corp.147 held that debtor’s
executory contract with the United States Navy to provide maintenance services
for the base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba could not be assumed because the AntiAssignment Act gave the Navy the unilateral right to reject further performance by
debtor.148 Yet, this case may be distinguished from Carolina Parachute, in that
there was some evidence as to debtor’s underperformance on existing provisions to
the government contract, even prior to filing bankruptcy, to which debtor failed to
cure or provide assurance and default resulted. The debtor corporation, on the
other hand, contended that it “performed satisfactorily . . . especially after the
filing Chapter 11 . . . and that the Navy refused to exercise the option due solely, or

141
Id. at 644 n.4. The court’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c)-2(f) (2009) was that “[t]his
provision clearly affords the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] the absolute right to terminate a
contract whether rightfully or wrongfully without fear that her actions will be reversed at a later date by
the courts.” Id. at 644.
142
Id. at 644-45.
143
U.S. Dept. of Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp. (In re Carolina Parachute Corp.), 108 B.R.
100, 100 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1989).
144
Id. at 102.
145
Id. at 101-102. “Carolina Parachute Corporation has manufactured parachutes and related
items primarily for the United States Government under fixed price defense contracts since 1979.” Id. at
101. “The government presented evidence that as of November, 1988, debtor was 40% delinquent in
performing under its modified delivery schedules. The government asserted that debtor’s failure to
make timely deliveries paralyzed the parachute training program at Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base.”
Id. at 101-102.
146
Id. at 103-104. “Accordingly, following the legal reasoning of the Third Circuit in Matter of
West Electronics, the Court determines that the automatic stay should have been modified to allow the
government to terminate the contract with debtor, pursuant to the provisions of 41 U.S.C. §15.” Id.
147
See In re Plum Run Service Corp., 159 B.R. 496 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
148
Id. at 498.
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in significant part to the Chapter 11 filing . . . .”149 Because the Navy argued
instead that there were problems “unrelated to the bankruptcy filing . . . from the
inception of its performance . . . continuing to the present date,” this case should
have been decided simply on the basis of pre-petition default and not post-petition
“applicable law.”150
Finally, in In re TechDYN Systems, the bankruptcy court simply concluded
that because a debtor was prohibited from assigning contracts equipping military
bases with telephone systems based on the plain language of the Anti-Assignment
Act, the debtor could not assume or assign its six pre-petition contracts.151
Despite the fact that the debtor never intended to assign its contracts, this court
applied the hypothetical test to the reading of the Bankruptcy Code 365(c) as first
introduced in the West Electronics case.152 However, hidden in the opinion was
the rationale in which “[t]he United States maintains that reliable, long-term
telecommunication capabilities at each installation affected by the debtor’s
bankruptcy is vital to the completion of ongoing military missions.”153 Unlike the
West Electronics and Braniff cases, the government clarified its position
concerning the applicability of the Anti-Assignment Act by affirming that
“national security interests at stake outweigh any benefit to the debtor and its estate
from assumption of the contracts.”154
2. Underdog Debtors May Be Gaining Headway
While the majority of cases seem to apply strict application of the AntiAssignment Act in government contract cases, the few cases that do not, entail
better legal reasoning and are more recent.
When Hartec Enterprises, Inc. (“Hartec”) filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition in 1987, it had already entered into numerous production contracts with
the Department of Defense. 155 The United States government set a deadline for
Hartec to assume the executory contracts post-petition.156 By 1990, all
dispositions of the contracts were resolved except for one involving the
Department of the Navy.157 Hartec wanted to assume the contract but the
government refused asserting its discretion to do so under Code section 365(c)(1)
and the federal Anti-Assignment Act.158 Like the cases already explicated, the
courts have struggled with harmonizing competing provisions of the bankruptcy
code: debtors’ right to assume or assign an executory contract with non-debtor
rights to annul executory contracts post petition. Surprisingly, the Hartec opinion

149

Id.
Id.
151
See In re TechDYN Sys. Corp., 235 B.R. 857, 863 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999).
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 859-60.
155
See In re Hartec Enters., Inc., 117 B.R. 865, 866 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
156
Id.
157
Id.; But see In re Hartec Enters., Inc., 130 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (vacating an
interlocutory order and dismissing the motion because the parties had settled).
158
In re Hartec Enters. Inc., 117 B.R. at 866-67.
150
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almost effortlessly strings together a logical argument asserting that “a debtor in
possession is not prohibited by 11 U.S.C. §365(c)(1) from assuming an executory
contract with the United States which is governed by 41 U.S.C. §15, with or
without the government’s consent.”159
The court basically rejected the
Hypothetical Test in favor of the Actual Test because the former unduly
overburdens a well-meaning debtor, and it “create[d] inherent inconsistencies”
with certain bankruptcy provisions while falling short of “fulfill[ing] the purposes
of the non-assignment statutes it seeks to enforce.”160
The court in In re Ontario Locomotive echoed the Hartec decision and
rejected the United States Navy’s assertion that the under the Anti-Assignment
Act, the government may terminate any contract, including the present contract for
the remanufacture of three locomotives, as a matter of convenience. 161 The
bankruptcy judge pointed to the government’s supporting papers which correctly
premised a “cause” requirement in support of their motion to terminate the
contract, but he rejected the proposal that Code section 365(c) and the AntiAssignment Act that simply “barr[ed] transfer of public contracts . . . absent the
consent of the Navy” automatically obstructed a debtor’s contract assumption
rights.162 In other words, the convenience of the government was insufficient
cause. The judge also reaffirmed the notions that the Anti-Assignment Act is only
concerned with transfers to an entirely “new entity,” while correspondingly, the
Bankruptcy Code section 365(c) was meant to prohibit assumption or assignment
of executory contracts of a personal service nature; a contract “which calls for the
performance of non-delegable duties.”163
Three years later, the Navy attempted to make the same unsuccessful
assertion that the Hypothetical Test under West Electronics governs any situation
where a “party entering into a lease or executory contract that subsequently files
bankruptcy would be precluded from assuming its own contract under Section
365(c)(1)(A) because bankruptcy created a third party in the form of a DIP as
distinguished from the original contracting party.”164 This case, In re American

159
Id. at 873. The linchpin of this court opinion cites to Thompson v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 205 F.2d 73, for interpretation of the underlying purpose of the Anti-Assignment Act. It is
interesting to note that that case takes the position that while the Anti-Assignment Act statutory
language is broad, it nonetheless “has never been applied blindly.” Thompson v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 205 F.2d 73, 76 (3d Cir. 1953). It is this author’s perspective that the statement is
contradicted by the West Electronics case, Peer Review holding, and Carolina Parachute decision. In
West Electronics, although military considerations were cited for the enactment of the Anti-Assignment
Act, the deciding court failed to rebut the lower court’s finding that at the time, no national defense
concerns begged relief from stay. See supra text accompanying note 100. In Peer Review, the court
denied a debtor’s attempt to assume an executory contract based solely on the power of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to do so. See supra text accompanying note 134. Then again in Carolina
Parachute, the court denies debtor’s right to assume a similar contract based on the literal and
mechanical application of the Anti-Assignment Act language while ignoring fact-specific
considerations in support of the overarching bankruptcy principle to promote business reorganization
efforts and at the same time, did not conflict with the purported purpose of the Anti-Assignment Act to
avoid obliging any government party from dealing with unknown third parties. See In re Carolina
Parachute, 108 B.R. 100, 102 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
160
In re Hartec Enters., Inc., 117 B.R. at 871.
161
See In re Ontario Locomotive, 126 B.R. 146, 146 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1991).
162
Id.
163
Id. at 147-48.
164
In re Am. Ship Bld. Co., 164 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
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Ship Building Co., Inc., in clear contrast to West Electronics, allowed a DIP to
assume a pre-petition executory contract to build ships with the United States Navy
despite the Anti-Assignment Act. 165
Most recently in 2006, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because a
debtor did not attempt to assign or transfer its executory contract involving the
future purchase of electric power, the Actual Test was a better approach to
determine whether the Anti-Assignment Act was “applicable law” for the purposes
of Code section 365(c) enabling a federal power marketing agency to terminate the
existing contract in violation of the automatic stay. 166 The court determined that
the federal entity could not terminate the contract for the following factual reasons:
(1) the debtor paid the government a monetary sum “as adequate assurance of its
ability to perform;” (2) the government did not qualify as a forward contract
merchant under Code section 362(b)(6) which would have entitled it to an
exception from the imposition of the automatic stay; and (3) the government
presented no basis for relief from stay. 167 This judicial opinion revisited the
“cause” requirement necessary to support a relief from stay. Because the
executory contract at issue involved the future purchase of electric power, the nondebtor “failed to demonstrate cause for relief where [it] would suffer no harm by
the continued enforcement of the stay.”168 The court also concluded that the
government could not terminate the contract for the following legal reasons: (1) an
valid ipso facto clause cannot be enforced against executory contracts; 169 and (2)
the Anti-Assignment Act did not preclude contract assumption because there was
no transfer or, in the alternative, the automatic stay take precedent over termination
rights under that federal statute and section 365(e)(2)(A).170 In fact, the judicial
analysis clarified the logistics of the Anti-Assignment Act by stating
the Act does not provide for automatic rescission of the public
contract upon transfer; annulment of the contract at issue
requires a response by the United States . . . and its effect on a
given executory contract, may be raised by the government after
the entry of a bankruptcy court’s automatic stay under . . . the
provision for stay modification.171
Therefore, it was wrong for the government to assume that it could declare the
165
Id. at 358. Notably, however, the court does distinguish a contrary result if it were the case that
the debtor wanted to assign the contract it entered into with the United States Navy. Id. at 362-63. The
opinion subtly declares that the bankruptcy code provision and the federal statute were designed to
prohibit this debtor to transfer its contractual rights to another debtor of like occupation, or in this
specific instance, “any third party shipwright.” Id. Thus, unlike the Ontario Locomotive case where
prohibition of assumption or assignment rights were contingent upon non-delegable duties, either this
court is contending the work of one shipbuilder is so unique it is inherently non-transferable to another
shipbuilder, or that generally, assumption is permitted but never assignment.
166
See generally In re Mirant Corp., 440 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2006).
167
Id. at 242-45.
168
Id. at 245.
169
Id. at 242. The parties’ agreement included a provision whereby the government could
terminate the contract if debtor filed bankruptcy. Id.
170
Id. at 245-47.
171
Id. at 252.
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debtor in default and demand a termination payment simply because debtor filed
bankruptcy.172
From the recent line of cases involving post-petition government contractors
asserting rights to executory contracts, it is reasonable to foresee that holdings
currying favor with government entities based on strict application of the AntiAssignment Act will become an increasingly unlikely occurrence. It makes more
sense and supports the interest of equitable considerations that the nature of the
contract should play a role in deciding whether the debtor can maintain its rights to
assumption or assignment of that government contract. In line with considering
the purpose and nature of an executory contract, the Hypothetical Approach should
be altogether eliminated. In Johnson Controls World Services Inc. v. U.S., the
court
determined that the Anti-Assignment Act did not apply to the
transfer of a government contract in connection with a corporate
reorganization, where the parent corporation that was the original
signatory to the government contract transferred the corporate
division that was performing the contract to a newly created
wholly owned subsidiary.173
Then later, in United International Investigative Services v. United States, the court
“rejected the government’s argument that the corporation to which the contract had
been transferred could not be the successor-in-interest to the original contractor
because the original contractor continued to exist after the transfer.”174 It is a fair
assumption to rely on the fact that as long as a successor corporation maintained
the same operations as its predecessor, the court would not treat the transfer as an
assignment to a distinctly separate entity that carried the potential for barring the
action under the Anti-Assignment Act. The assignee remaining in contention is
wholly distinct third parties.
IV. IMPACT
A. Lessons Learned
In reverting back to the big picture of debtor versus government, the legal
debate begs the question: What method of legal analysis is most conducive to the
success of the U.S. economy? Throughout this article, it is evident that the AntiAssignment Act should not be automatically enforced any time the question of
assumption or assignment of a government contract is involved.
In an article by Patrick Jackson, the author discusses considerations to help
determine the permissibility of executory contract modification, and refers to a
“material and economically significant” standard taken from the case In re Joshua
Slocum, Ltd .175 The article reveals that the standard is notable for its attempt to
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Id. at 242.
Cockerell, supra note 2, at 19 (citing 44 Fed. Cl. 334 (1999), appeal dismissed by consent, 217
F.3d 853 (1999)).
174
Id. (citing 26 Cl. Ct. 892 (1992)).
175
See generally, Patrick A. Jackson, Third Circuit Confirms Court’s Power to Modify Executory
173
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balance dual goals between parties in a bankruptcy proceeding: “preventing
substantial economic detriment to the nondebtor contracting party and permitting
the bankruptcy estate’s realization of the intrinsic value of its assets.”176 So, in
considering whether a contract term can be modified, the author suggests that the
court in a 2005 case got it right when it evaluated individual contract terms based
on whether it was integral or material to the bargain between the parties and if the
term were breached, whether any party would suffer economic detriment. 177 This
view supports the contention that bankruptcy code provisions, particularly with
reference to section 365(f), should outweigh non-bankruptcy statutes in Chapter 11
proceedings. Again, the consensus remains that while applicable law like the AntiAssignment Act can and should protect the US government in their contractual
interests, it should not be applied without regard to the precise nature of the
contract a debtor seeks to assume or assign.
To that end, there should be a nuanced analysis considering a totality of the
circumstances. Regardless of the case holding, the judicial opinions discussed in
great lengths above noted a spectrum of factual considerations. Many of those
government contract cases involve the United States Navy and other entities under
the control of the Department of Defense. Also, while many judges easily dismiss
the scope of section 365(c) as being limited to “personal attention and services,” it
is ironic that the reasons cited for government discretion concerning militaryrelated contracts include a debtor’s unique position to render performance.178
Promoting a holistic approach to these cases, without feeling compelled to
establish a general sway in support of the government’s contractual rights, or
alternatively, fostering a debtor’s plans for reorganization, would be more valuable
to contracting parties in a complex economy.
If future cases follow current trends, this author believes that contracting
parties can expect to find courts to be less convinced by the Hypothetical Test,
more discerning to consider the application of the Anti-Assignment Act based on a
comparison to legislative intents, and prone to rethink the long-standing
interpretation of that section 365(c)’s “applicable law” designation was not
specifically limited to personal service contracts. Thus, going forward, courts
would be wise to consider a totality of the circumstances examination when faced
with legal battles involving assumption and assignment of executory contracts
involving government agreements. Many court opinions are in line with this
holistic view but draft holdings to reflect a mechanical application of legal
principles ignoring factual considerations mentioned. In an effort to foster this
modest change, this Comment proposes that our holistic approach be referred to as
the Actual Test Plus.
B. A New Test
While no single factor is determinative, some factors of the Actual Test Plus
may be weightier than others. Courts should consider (1) whether there was actual

Contracts, Clarifies Joshua Slocum “Material and Economically Significant” Standard,” 26 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32 (2007) (citing In re Joshua Slocum, Ltd., 99 B.R. 250 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)).
176
Id. at 74.
177
Id.
178
See supra text accompanying note 105.
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intent to assign the contract or merely assume; (2) if the intent to assign exists,
whether it constitutes a transfer involving the assignment of rights or delegation of
duties to a wholly distinct third party; (3) what pre-petition circumstances are
pertinent – if there was a default, whether the DIP cured, provided adequate
assurance to cure the default or pledge future performance; and (4) why the
government should be entitled to a relief from automatic stay.
As to prong one, because a DIP may assume a contract without assigning,
the government party cannot assert a lifting of the stay or termination of the
contract based on the uncertainty that it will have to deal with a party it did not
contract with. For instance, in Braniff, the DIP attempted to assign the benefits of
airport landing slots to a party that was not licensed to operate at a national
airport.179 Because the government would be placed at risk to deal with an
assignee who did not meet the federal requirements, evidence of an actual
assignment should weigh in favor of the government. Likewise, in the case of
Techdyn Systems, because there was clear indication that the DIP never intended to
assign its contracts, the analysis should have shifted to focus on the government’s
justification for barring assumption (prong four). 180
Concerning prong two, several courts have supported the interpretation that
the Anti-Assignment Act was designed to protect the government from dealing
with strangers. It is the foundational difference between the Hypothetical Test and
the Actual Test. It should not be the case, referring to the Hypothetical Test, that a
pre-petition debtor’s contract is an assignment of rights or a delegation of duties
when that debtor holds the same contract as a post-petition DIP. If it is the case
that in filing bankruptcy, the DIP struggled to maintain current operations, then the
government could again assert its risk of losing the benefit of its bargain in the
original contract (prong four).
The consideration for pre-petition circumstances in prong three is prompted
by cases like Carolina Parachute and Plum Run. Interestingly in Carolina
Parachute, it was the government’s “lack of outside working capital” that forced
the company to file bankruptcy so it could reorganize. 181 This is significant
because when the company recommenced work on the government contracts it was
able to provide consistent delivery of its manufactured items for a nine-month
period.182 Unfortunately, after that nine-month period, when the company became
delinquent in performance, the government asserted that it lost its benefit of the
bargain.183 However, when the court presented its holding, it cited the AntiAssignment Act as authority for the government to terminate the contract
notwithstanding “debtor’s performance under its contracts with the government,
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In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d at 941.
The logic here is, if the government entered into the original contract, it obviously deemed the
arrangement beneficial, so unless the debtor could not prove capacity to cure the default for assumption
purposes, the government termination of the contract would not be in good faith (it could implicate the
government’s attempt to renegotiate better terms with a new party). Similarly, in an assignment
arrangement, the government should be able to articulate reasons for rejecting third party performance
of a pre-petition contract.
181
In re Carolina Parachute Corp., 108 B.R. 100, 101 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1989).
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Id.
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Id. at 102.
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and the financial status of the debtor.”184 The contention here is not that debtor’s
post-petition breach would change the outcome of the court’s decision, but that the
court performs a disservice to contracting parties looking to case precedent for
basis to support its holding other than Anti-Assignment Act empowerment by
judicial fiat. The facts of Plum Run are similar; there was clear proof that the
debtor underperformed according to the terms of the contract and could not cure or
provide assurance of its ability to cure. 185 Again, the pre-petition circumstances
were vital to the government’s decision to file a relief from stay to terminate the
contract, yet the judicial determination finds its authority in the Anti-Assignment
Act and application of the misconstrued Hypothetical Test.186 Instead, courts
should look to the Mirant case as a guideline for pre-petition circumstances. In
Mirant, the debtor provided the government with adequate assurance of its ability
to continue performance on its existing contract which preempted the
government’s ability to terminate or modify despite the existing federal antiassignment statute.187
With regard to prong four, a recurring observation from the case explication
and analysis in this Comment fosters the strong belief that government parties
should give substantive reasons for authorizing or rejecting assumption or
assignment of executory contracts. The legislative intent behind the AntiAssignment Act has been somewhat ambiguous. In reference to West Electronics,
some scholars are adamant that avoiding assignment of military equipment
contracts was precisely what Congress intended when it granted broad authority to
governments involving their contractual rights and obligations. Of course, if that
were the case, it implores the logical question as to why that Anti-Assignment Act
was drafted in a more narrowly-tailored fashion. In the related cases this Comment
has covered, the executory contracts have involved contracts for telephone
services, parachute manufacturing, maintenance services, guarantee agreements,
electric power, review of health care services, and the use of navigable airspace
and terminal allotment. These goods and services do not seem to rise to the level
of national security concerns inherent in military equipment contracts for missile
defense.
It is reasonable to use the Anti-Assignment Act to protect the country from
the assumption or assignment of military contracts when the civilian or nongovernment contracting party needs a license or certain security clearance to
perform the contract terms. These considerations, however, are very much akin to
personal service contracts and non-delegable duties.188 On the other hand,
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Id..
In re Plum Run Serv. Corp., 159 B.R. 496, 500 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
Id. at 501.
In re Mirant Corp., 440 F.3d at 242.
HERBERT, supra note 11, at 149. Michael J. Herbert clarifies that
[i]t is a staple of contract law that some duties cannot be delegated because they
are fundamental to the underlying bargain. These duties are often misleadingly
referred to as “personal services.” This is not quite accurate. Many personal
services can be delegated and some non-delegable duties are not personal
services. The real issue is whether performance by a particular person or
organization is a fundamental part of the bargain. Personal services only come
into it because it is easiest to find illustrations in certain types of personal service
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performance in the form of review of health care services, in the Peer Review case,
is likely to be transferable; it is a service that a third party could easily perform. It
may be helpful to note that if we can infer that the government chose the original
contracting party based on thorough examination, trust, or otherwise, it might
make sense that the original contracting party would be in the best position to
determine whether it could assume post-petition or to which entity it should assign
its obligations. In Chapter 11 proceedings between a DIP and government entity,
the overarching concern to determine the permissibility of a proposed assumption
or assignment of pre-petition contracts between the parties should be whether such
authorization would thwart the government’s bargain. If the government is still
getting the benefit of its bargain and its resources and national security concerns
are not put to risk, a debtor party should be afforded the benefit of its executory
contract rights under section 362(a), unless the government can substantiate cause
to justify extreme measures such as lifting the automatic stay to terminate a preexisting contract.
V. CONCLUSION
The best compromise between bankruptcy principles and antithetical federal
laws that will serve the United States economy is that judicial decisions concerning
executory contract treatment should operate by essentially maintaining a debtor in
possession’s right to assume and assign its contracts while giving the United States
government veto power based on substantiated goals and important safety and
welfare concerns. Maintaining the status quo under section 362(a) allows for more
prompt and effective reorganization plans to be adopted while addressing the
United States government concerns for quality assignees.
Contracting parties should keep in mind that while it is feasible for
government contractors to enter into novation agreements with the government, it
is possible that the mere proposal of such an arrangement would put the contractor
at risk of losing the contract. Some scholars have proposed the following
recommendation: when it is likely that the government has a strong vested interest
in the executory contract, and it is possible to obtain government consent to
assumption and assignment, contracting parties should do so. Such parties should
recall from the above-referenced cases, that if the terms of their performance are
akin to personal service contracts, are tied to national security concerns, or have a
material impact on the economic position of the government party, it will be
almost impossible to avoid a ban on transfer rights under the Anti-Assignment Act.
However, looking to current judicial trends, it does seems clear that so long as a
transfer does not force the government to deal with an entirely distinct third party
assignee, the debtor in possession is more than likely to succeed in assuming the
contract post-petition. Thus, a valid and acceptable transfer will include subsidiary
or successor parties to the debtor.

contracts.
Id.
Furthermore, “rarer than non-delegable duties are non-assignable benefits. There are now very few
circumstances under which a party to a contract is prohibited from assigning the benefit of its bargain to
another. Many of the few restrictions that exist are in fact round-about ways of restricting delegation.”
Id.
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This Comment hopes the Actual Test Plus proposal would be recognized as a
modest renovation to judicial interpretation of executory contracts involving
government parties in a post-petition context. While it is unlikely that this
Comment will be the last word on the issue, it is submitted as a contribution to
provide some constructive ideas on balancing debtor interest with non-debtor
concerns which play a vital role in the U.S. economy.

